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Abstract
The health status - meant as the WHO definition - of the elderly is 
affected by changes in the demographic patterns. Lowering fertility, 
declining frequency of marriages and the growing number of divorces 
decrease the probability of finding care on the side of the family after one's 
reaching a ripe old age. All this enforces changes in the care system for the 
elderly. The traditional - basing on family bonds - model is being superseded 
by institutional - financed from public means - forms. In the case of Poland 
the changes in the care system - especially the care for people requiring it all 
the time - resulting from demographic conditions are even more important 
as the Polish society is bound to be subject to acceleration of the ageing 
processes in the first half of the 2 1-st century.
While speaking about the health status of the elderly one must not omit 
factors determining this state. From now on let us take the W HO definition of health 
which comprises such factors as frame of mind, social and physical conditions. In 
the paper I would like to answer the question about the role o f the past, present and 
future changes in the demographic patterns. As already known, during the process 
of modernisation the Polish society of the 20-th century was subject to an 
accelerated - as compared to more civilised countries - demographic transition. The 
most characteristic feature of this process was transition from relatively high to 
relatively low mortality and fertility. As it is commonly known the large numbers of 
old people who emerged during several dozen years resulted from this demographic 
transition: this absolute increase is a consequence of the lowering mortality which 
makes people reach a ripe old age whereas the relative increase is caused by smaller 
numbers of the newly born - that is by the lower fertility.
Further on we would like to highlight the most important possible effects of 
the changes in the demographic patterns upon the welfare of the elderly - the effects 
o f so called the second and the third demographic transition.
Assuming that the family favourably affects the health status irrespective of 
one's age (although there is some evidence that it might be the proper health itself 
that underlies one's decision to start family [9]) we are going to reflect the evolution 
which the Polish family is bound to face as well as the possible consequences of this 
evolution upon the health status of the elderly. Favourable effects of living in the
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family might be observed through comparing the structures of people aged 50 and 
over with respect to the populations of the living (data from the representative 
census o f 1995) and of the dead (data of 1996) (see: table 1). We assume indirectly 
that the mortality o f the elderly is the best indicator possible to measure their health 
status.
Table 1. The structure of the elderly by marital status (the living - 1995, the deceased - 1996)
M arital Males Fem ales
Age status the living the dead the living the dead
50-59 years single 6.0 12.3 4.0 7.9
old married 86.7 69.8 74.0 62.9
widowed 2.8 6.0 15.9 20.1
divorces 4.5 11.9 6.1 9.1
60 year single 3.3 4.2 5.3 8.5
and over m arried 80.9 67.8 41.2 19.8
widowed 13.2 24.4 50.5 68.6
divorced 2.6 3.6 3.0 3.1
Source: Own calculations on the basis o f  the Demographic Yearbook o f  1997, CSO. Warsaw
Both in the case of men and women their marital status influences the 
mortality. Married people are characterised by lower mortality which might be 
accounted for both emotional (life joy, assistance in everyday life) and behavioural 
factors (regular way of living, risk aversion - e.g. lower consumption of alcohol and 
tobacco) as well as for economic factors (returns to scale owing to work 
diversification within the family household). In this context there should be some 
worries about the fact o f marriage evasion and the growing number o f divorces in 
Poland. In future such phenomena can lead to an increase in the number o f the 
lonely which might aggravate the relative welfare. Additionally, in the case of 
females to be single or to be divorced entails starting a job which in future 
sometimes results in some occupational ailments. To belittle the present tendency 
towards contracting marriages and their durability, it should be added that we might 
merely face some term changes in starting the family rather than the diminishing 
willingness to contract marriages.
Bearing in mind all the problems facing the health and pension systems it 
seems obvious that it is the family of the old person that should be in more charge of 
caring for them. It is not about all the forms of care but first o f all about prophylaxis 
and the care for the chronically disabled. As far as prophylaxis is concerned a case 
in point might be properly designed furniture and other furnishings to enable the 
invalid to function on their own (e.g. toilet handles and arrangement of everyday 
objects fixed in such a way to avoid unnecessary bending which however, very often
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entails redecorating all the place of dwelling [5]). In the case of the chronically 
disabled what matters is - depending on the situation - ensuring all day or at least 
part time care.
While speaking about the duties of the old man's family and other forms of 
aid with respect to the elderly, we did not mean their spouses as the average age 
difference between partners to the marriage is only 2-3 years. The spouse is thus old 
themselves and is not always able to give a helping hand. It is then the old man's 
offspring that should take care of the old. Further on we are going to discuss the 
changes in fertility patterns and their consequences. As already mentioned, the post­
transition demographic state is characterised by low fertility which is reflected by 
the fertility indicator showing how many children are born by one woman. In Poland 
this indicator has been declining for many years and in 1996 it was 1.58. To assure 
the simple generation substitution it should be 2.15. In some urban regions the 
indicator hardly exceeded one (in Lodz Voivodship - 1.233, in Warsaw - 1.283, in 
Katowice - 1.332). Such a situation means that - under the traditionally prevailing 
family pattern 2 + 2 - there must also be couples who decide not to have children at 
all, couples called dinkies (double income, no kids). Both spouses in such marriages 
are occupationally active and make efficient use of contraceptives. As a result we 
should expect the number of childless families to grow which might additionally 
burden the present system of health care. At the same time the increasing popularity 
of one-child families has it that after reaching old age a single and childless person 
will not have any support on the side of the relatives. Parents of an only child might 
experience a similar situation if their child undergoes an accident or decides to leave 
their parents' place of living. To understand this question better let us take France as 
an example, where in 1970 10% of people aged 60 and over did have neither 
offspring nor siblings. The evolution of fertility is likely to copy the situation from 
previous centuries - it is estimated that in the 18th century France ca 25% people 
aged 60-85 did not have any relatives in direct line [6]. At the end of the 70’s 10% 
of old people in Poland did not offspring, either [11].
Forms and frequency of aid given by the family to the old depend on a lot of 
factors. Let us mention two of such factors: occupational activities and the place of 
residence of the old man's relatives. As far as occupational activities are concerned 
they are likely to affect not the frequency of aid but its forms. The example of the 
USA shows that the growing participation of females in the labour market, which 
took place in the 70’s, resulted in an increased demand for private health and 
nursing services which as a result contributed to the emergence of a dynamically 
developing sector of the economy [8].
The other of the above-mentioned factors - the place of residence of the old 
man's relatives - determines the time and the frequency of the care. In this case - 
assuming that space vicinity makes contacts easier - it is worthy to get acquainted 
with the forecast regarding households elaborated by the CSO [Boleslawski, 1997], 
The forecast envisages that in the years 1996-2020 the number of households will 
grow by 27.8% whereas the population - by only 5.4%. It means that the average
number of household members will drop from 3.064 to 2.539 persons and the 
number of adults - from 2.220 to 1.937. These quantitative changes will result from 
an increasing share of small, one or two-person households which is going to be a 
consequence of the following demographic patterns: contracting marriages at more 
mature age, conscious living in celibacy, the increasing number of knowingly 
childless couples, anti-mortal actions protracting life expectancy.
In the end we conclude that in the course of ageing processes the number of 
old people running one-person households is going to grow.
One consequence of the longer life expectancy of females is that there will be 
a lot of one-woman - especially one-widow - households. The forecast seems to 
substantiate the thesis that the old are bound to be more spatially distant from their 
families, although the housing might alleviate this situation. W hether spatial 
distance means living in solitude depends much more on other factors. O f such 
factors let us touch on inter-generation flows that determine the direction and the 
amount of the inter-generation support given within one family. According to some 
researchers we witness considerable overestimation of the role of the family and 
family bonds.
This process started as early as in the 17th century when our ancestors began 
getting interested in their closest relatives rather than in their whole social 
environment [1]. This tendency is getting consolidated nowadays, which is favoured 
by the transition of the household from production to consumption unit [3], Earnings 
gained in developed countries let people possess substantial means even after 
satisfying their basic needs. Those means can be spent on goods and services, the 
main purpose of which is to enjoy family members and consolidate the family. The 
family o f today is characterised by the anxiety to satisfy three feelings: romantic 
love that underlies each marriage; parental love associated with maternity; 
domesticity where family bonds are stronger than external bonds [3].
W hile speaking about inter-generation flows it should be stated that they are 
not symmetric as they usually flow into the young, although this situation reverses at 
a certain age. The financial flows are clearly unfavourable for the old whereas the 
balance of services is more equivalent. This is so because - despite low real incomes 
of the old - pensions are still relatively high (if compared to wages and salaries) 
which is additionally accompanied by low consumption expectations of the old. As a 
result, the old are able to transfer some part o f their income to their children and 
grandchildren. This refers especially to the basic good being dwelling-place.
The second part o f the intergenerational flows form non-material services. In 
this case the old improve their balance in the course of age. While getting older they 
are less suitable to help their descendants with such work as looking after 
grandchildren, going shopping, etc. On the contrary, they themselves need more aid 
and their families must get engaged more in caring for them. While commenting on 
the intergenerational flows I am far from stating that the old are abused by the 
young idlers - their offspring or grandchildren. From the point of view of the old
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helping their descendants is one way of confirming their utility so it should be rather 
viewed as a psychotherapy.
The prolonging life expectancy in Poland will lead to considerable increase 
in the number of old people the descendants of whose are bound to be old and 
unable to function on their own, too. At present in Poland there are ca 800 thousand 
people aged 80 and over and over 300 thousand people aged 85 and over who call 
for permanent care (according to American gerontologists each person aged 80 and 
over requires permanent care) and whose children are usually 50-60 years old. The 
future growth in the number of the elderly is going to entail some other 
unprecedented problems regarding health care. Bearing in mind the fact that people 
aged 60 or so are usually physically fit we can expect them to get engaged more in 
caring for ripe old people.
The present demographic tendencies not only adversely affect the probability 
that the old man will find some guardians among their descendants but they also 
limit kinship networks so that in future we might face the world in which lots of 
people will be on their own - without siblings, cousins or even further family - all 
those who might be interested in their lot [3]. This is going to increase the 
importance of the institutions specialised in caring for the elderly. The spread of 
females' occupational activities is going to act in the same direction as some part of 
women engaged in work is sure to make use of specialistic institutions against 
payment.
In the end I would like to present a forecast regarding the future number of 
the elderly people in Poland. Data on changes in the number of old people by five- 
year periods can be found in a forecast elaborated by the UNO Population 
Department. The forecast has a long time horizon - up to the year 2050 (see: table 
2). The forecast was based upon the ageing method and should be regarded as 
highly probable.
Table 2. The elderly (in thousands) in Poland in the years 2000-2050 according to the UN 
estim ates (m oderate variant)
Age Years
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
60-64 1701 1481 2205 2668 2688 2210 2054 2409 2777 2954 2600
65-69 1602 1514 1325 1986 2415 2446 2021 1886 2222 2574 2747
70-74 1345 1339 1275 1126 1697 2077 2117 1758 1651 1958 2278
75-79 908 1012 1016 977 868 1319 1626 1670 1401 1328 1589
80+ 712 835 964 1046 1080 1052 1290 1602 1825 1830 1817
60+ 6268 6181 6785 7803 8748 9104 9108 9325 9876 10644 11031
Source: The Sex and Age D istribution o f  the World Populations, The 1996 Revision, New York 
UN, 1997  p. 673.
In the whole period under consideration the number of the elderly people in 
Poland is growing. In some five-year periods this growth is slow, in some others - 
much faster. Only between 2000 and 2005 their number will decline which results 
from the war baby depression. The most conspicuous feature is their relative 
increase in the successive age groups. The 60-64 age group increases by 52.8%, the 
75-79 - by 74.7% and the 80 and over - by 155.2%. In future we will face a constant 
increase in the population of elderly, and especially - of very old people. All this 
means that in the several dozen years to come the population of old people will 
grow by 3/4 and the demand for medical care will grow even more - owing to the 
structure of the population. It should be noticed that it is women that are going to 
make up the lion's share of people advanced in years. Their quantitative supremacy 
is getting more visible in the successive age groups. This fact affects to much extent 
the system of health care as women much more often than men visit doctors, are 
hospitalised, stay in sanatoria, purchase medicines and are dependent on the family.
For financial reasons and from the point of view of the efficiency of the 
health system it is important to state what will be the share of old people in the total 
population of Poland. Proper data is reported in table 3.
T able 3. Old people in Poland in the years 2000-2010 (per 1000)
Age Years
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
60-64 43 37 55 67 67 55 51 60 69 74 65
65-69 41 38 33 49 60 61 50 47 55 64 69
70-74 34 34 32 28 42 51 53 44 41 49 57
75-79 23 25 25 24 21 32 40 41 35 33 40
80+ 18 21 24 26 27 26 32 40 45 46 45
60+ 161 158 172 196 219 227 228 233 248 267 277
Source: Own calculations on the basis o f  the United Nations estimates [UN, 1997, p. 673]
W ithin the 50 years to come we expect - unless there is drastic deterioration 
in mortality rates - a considerable increase in the shares of old people in the total 
population of Poland. At the beginning of the 21-st century every sixth person will 
be more than 60 years old whereas in the middle of the next century every fourth 
person will fall into this group. In the first decade of the 21-st century there will be 
only slight changes in this respect but later on they are going to take momentum. 
Judging by the present favourable tendencies in mortality observed for several years, 
one may claim that the presented forecast underestimates the actual number of old 
people to live in Poland in the 21-st century. In such a situation it is of much 
importance to compare the life expectancies o f old people in Poland and other 
developed European countries. According to the data of 1996 an average 60 year- 
old Polish man is to live another 15.93 years whereas that 65 years of age - 12.93. 
The respective numbers for women are 20.52 and 15.53 years. In 1997 the
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respective numbers were: males: 16.13 and 13.13, females: 20.80 and 16.79. Proper 
data regarding some other countries are reported in table 4.
The average life expectancy of people on the verge of old age is by 2-2.5 
years shorter in Poland than in other developed European countries. The parameters 
observed in the other countries should be viewed as Poland's future values. As far as 
the life expectancies are concerned the time distance between Poland and the other 
countries is a quarter of a century. Basing on the data reported one may claim that 
the public health care system will not be able to satisfy all the needs demanded by 
the old.
Table 4. Life expectancy of people aged 60 and 65 in som e European countries 
in the years 1960-1990
60 years o f  age 65 years o f age
Country 1960 1970 1980 1990 I960 1970 1980 1990
M ales
United
Kingdom 15.0 15.2 15.9 17.6 11.9 12.0 12.6 14.1
France 15.6 16.2 17.3 19.0 12.5 13.0 14.0 15.6
Italy 16.7 16.7 16.8 18.6 13.4 13.3 13.3 15.1
Norway 18.0 17.3 17.7 18.3 14.5 13.8 14.3 14.6
Fem ales
United
Kingdom 18.9 19.8 20.4 21.7 15.1 16.0 16.6 17.8
France 19.5 20.8 22.4 24.2 15.6 16.8 18.2 19.9
Italy 19.3 20.2 21.2 23.0 15.3 16.2 17.1 18.8
Norway 20.2 21.0 22.2 22.7 16.1 16.8 18.0 18.6
Source: W iszniewskij A., D em ograficzieskijpo tencja ł Rossji, Woprosy Ekonom iki", 1998, nr 3
p. 120
It should be stressed that under many years of negligence accompanied by 
underinvestment and nonchalant attitude towards this issue on the side o f authorities 
the situation seems unlikely to get better before the second decade of the 21-st 
century when people born during the post-war baby boom period are going to enter 
their pensionable age. The more will have to be required then on the side of old 
people's families. One may even suppose that it is also the public sector that will 
find it advisable to transfer as many care duties as possible to the old people's 
families after having made them acquainted with methods of treating people 
advanced in years. One may also suppose that the private sector of medical and 
nursing services will expand, too, following higher living standards of the Polish 
family.
The family of today faces a lot of problems that did not use to exist before or 
existed on a much smaller scale only. One of such problems is the care for the 
elderly. The protracting life expectancy reflected by the rectungulization of the life 
expectancy curve has it that - assuming stability of the probability of deaths - ca 
82% o f the newly born will live to be 60, 65% of them will reach 70 and 37% - the 
age of 80. The scale of the ageing processes necessities combining various forms of 
care for the elderly. One of them is inherently related to the family which was 
traditionally regarded as the mainstay of the old age. It was own children that used 
to be perceived as the best assurance against old age. Viewing the present situation 
through this multi-century axiom let us hope that the current tendencies in fertility 
and contracting marriages are only temporary problems.
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